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Abstract
This paper examines breakup fees and stock lockups as devices for prospective target
firms to encourage bidder participation in takeover contest. We show that, unless bidding
costs for the first bidder are too high, breakup fees provide for the socially desirable degree
of competition and ensure the eﬃcient allocation of the target to the highest valued buyer
in a takeover auction. In contrast, stock lockups permit the target firm to subsidize entry
of a new bidder at the expense of an incumbent bidder. Stock lockups induce too much
competition when oﬀered to a second bidder and too little competition when oﬀered to a
first bidder. Despite their socially wasteful properties, target management would favor stock
lockups as they induce takeover competition at least cost to the target.
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An unprecedented volume of mergers and acquisitions has occurred in the United States within
the last decade. Many of these mergers have included lockup clauses requiring the target corpo-
rations to compensate prospective bidders in case the acquisition is not consummated. Common
lockup measures include a fixed cash payment, called a “breakup fee” (or “termination fee"),
paid to the losing bidder and a stock option called “stock lockup,” enabling the losing bidder to
purchase shares of the target corporation at a reduced price.1 The frequency and size of lock-
ups are increasing. Almost two-thirds of the merger agreements announced between 1997 and
1999 included breakup payments (Oﬃcer, 2002), with stock lockups being used half as often as
breakup fees (Coates and Subramanian, 2000). For acquisitions exceeding $5 billion, the median
breakup fee has risen from 1.4 percent to 2.9 percent of the transaction price during the 1997
to 2002 period.2
Despite the increasing prominence of lockups their use remains controversial among legal
scholars and financial analysts. Prior analyses largely agree with the “irrelevance” theorem
established by Ayres (1990) proclaiming that lockups do not aﬀect the allocational eﬃciency of
takeovers once bidding competition commences with “non-foreclosing bids."3 Yet, the normative
prescriptions on lockups range from one extreme that the courts should validate all lockups
(Fraidin and Hanson (1996)) to the other extreme that courts should carefully scrutinize all
lockup provisions (Kahan and Klausner (1996)). The controversy stems from conflicting eﬀects
of lockups on bidder participation. On the one hand, a lockup encourages participation of a
recipient bidder and thus facilitates competition for the target, which can be socially desirable
given the sunk costs and informational spillovers from initiating a takeover bid.4 On the other
1A third type of lockup is “asset lockup” which aﬀords a buyer an option to purchase assets of the target (e.g.,
its subsidiary divisions) when another buyer purchases a significant amount of shares. Asset lockups are almost
extinct, however (see Coates and Subramanian, 2000). Note also the standard trigger events for lockups are either
consummation of a merger with (or purchase of a significant block of target shares by) a third party or rejection
of the deal with the recipient by target shareholders. Hence, lockups diﬀer from defensive measures like “poison
pills" that are triggered by a shift of control. Berkovitch and Khana (1990) refer to these defensive measures as
value reducing defensive strategies (VRDS). They demonstrate that although these measures may protect and
entrench target management, they may also increase shareholder surplus from a takeover.
2“MergerTalk: Corporate break-ups get harder to do" Reuters : April 18, 2003.
3A non-foreclosing bid, described below, is one that does not terminate the takeover contest. Apparently, the
lone objection to the Ayres’ theorem comes from Coates and Subramanian (2000) based on heuristic and empirical
arguments.
4Bidders incur substantial costs evaluating the target’s assets, and financing and preparing a takeover bid.
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hand, oﬀering a lockup to a bidder may reduce a non-recipient bidder’s chance of winning and
thereby discourage his participation. This reduces competition for the target, which may be
socially undesirable.
While existing legal studies recognize these conflicting eﬀects, the formal analyses they em-
ploy are incomplete in several respects. First, most of the extant literature does not explicitly
model the bidder’s participation decision, although this is crucial for understanding the sub-
sidizing/foreclosing eﬀects of lockups mentioned above. Second, the prior analyses of bidding
competition typically presume buyers are perfectly informed of each others’ valuations. While
this is a useful simplification, it is clearly unrealistic and may generate misleading results. For
instance, as we demonstrate below, Ayres’ irrelevance theorem and the Coase theorem do not
generalize when bidders are privately informed of their valuations for the target.5 Third, the
extant studies do not distinguish between diﬀerent types of lockup measures. Interestingly,
this sharply contrasts with the attitude of courts which have been much more lenient towards
breakup fees than stock lockups.6 Given the importance of the case law, the courts’ asymmetric
treatment of stock lockups warrants a careful comparison of the two diﬀerent measures. Fourth,
the existing literature fails to distinguish adequately between shareholder interests and social
welfare. The primary focus of the literature has been maximization of the shareholder interest,
although it need not coincide with the social objective. As we demonstrate below, some lockup
measures increase shareholder revenue but reduce social surplus by inducing too much or too
little competition for the target.
In this paper, we distinguish between the eﬀects of breakup fees and stock lockups on the
Once one bids, rival buyers learn of the takeover and enter the competition for the target. This reduces the return
from target acquisition and has a chilling eﬀect on the takeover. Lockups reduce a buyer’s risk from takeover,
by increasing the return from acquisition and thereby leading to greater competition in the market for corporate
control.
5Fraidin and Hanson (1996) base its permissive view of lockups largely on the Coase theorem, which implies
that bargaining continues until the eﬃcient allocation is achieved. Asymmetric information introduces a form of
transaction costs which undermines the central force of the Coase theorem.
6The precedence setting event was Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. amid the former’s
merger agreement with Viacom, which included both breakup fees and stock lockups. The Delaware Chancery
court enjoined stock lockups but upheld the breakup fees. On the appeal by QVC, but not on the breakup fee
component, the Delaware Supreme court was critical on both but more on the stock lockup. The courts’ diﬀerential
treatment of the two instruments was influenced by several unusual features of the case such as relatively small
size of the breakup fee and no caps on the size of stock lockup. Nonetheless, the treatment led to the relative
decrease in the use of stock lockups (see Coates and Subramanian, 2000).
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social eﬃciency of takeover and the welfare of target shareholders. Further, we study the ef-
fects of lockups in diﬀerent stages of the takeover contest by analyzing their impact on bidder
participation over time. We confirm that lockups may induce a first bidder to put the target
in play by compensating that bidder for identifying the target as a viable takeover prospect to
the market. We also find that lockups may likewise induce second bidders to compete for the
target.7 Without any subsidy, a second buyer may not compete against a better informed first
bidder who oﬀers a preemptively high initial bid. The target can counteract the preemptive bid
by subsidizing the second bidder through a lockup. The possibility of such a lockup in turn
reduces the first bidder’s incentive for preemptive bidding.
In what follows, we primarily focus on the faithful target board of directors who employ
lockup policies to maximize shareholder value from takeover. This approach yields a reasonable
first-cut analysis of the role of lockups and serves to highlight how the pursuit of shareholder
interest may deviate from that of social welfare maximization. We later consider the possibility
that an unfaithful management/board may misuse lockups to manipulate the takeover outcome
for their private benefit, and examine the susceptibility of the alternative lockup provisions to
such misuse.
Our central findings are summarized as:
• Non-equivalence of lockup provisions: Contrary to conventional wisdom and Ayres’ irrele-
vance theorem, breakup fees and stock lockups have distinct eﬀects on corporate takeover.
Breakup fees are non-distortionary and provide for the target to be acquired by the highest
valued buyer in a bidding contest. In contrast, stock lockups distort the bidding process,
sometimes permitting a lower valued buyer to acquire the target.
• Breakup fees may implement socially eﬃcient takeover: When all lockup measures are
prohibited, there is insuﬃcient participation of potential buyers in takeover contests. The
first bidder is inadequately rewarded for its search eﬀort that reveals valuable information
about the target to subsequent bidders. Second bidders are deterred from entering the
takeover contest too frequently by a preemptory first buyer bid. Lockups enable target
management to subsidize the entry of bidders. The regulatory rule that permits only
7Targets often employ a lockup to recruit a second bidder in response to, or in anticipation of, an initial
takeover bid. In the famed Revlon takeover case, Revlon’s oﬀer of lockup to Forstmann Little and Co. was a
response to an initial takeover bid by the Pantry Pride, Inc. Similarly, the Warner-Lambert Company oﬀered
lockup provisions to the American Home Products in anticipation of a hostile takeover attempt by the Pfizer.
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breakup fees dominates the prohibition of all forms of lockups. In plausible circumstances,
the breakup fees implement socially eﬃcient takeover, by inducing the socially desired
degree of initial bidder preemption.
• Stock lockups may induce too much or too little competition: Stock lockups shift rents
away from the non-recipient to the recipient buyer, allowing the target to subsidize the
recipient buyer at the expense of the other bidder. Consequently, when stock lockups are
used to stimulate second buyer bidding they induce excess competition, and when they
are employed to subsidize first buyers they induce too little competition.
• Targets prefer stock lockups: Despite their socially wasteful properties, the target man-
agement would favor stock lockups, as they subsidize recipients’ bidding at the expense of
non-recipients.8
The remainder of the paper begins with Section 2 which examines the eﬀect of lockups on
bidding competition. Section 3 models and analyzes the sequential participation of bidders in
takeover contests. Section 4 discusses some extensions of the analysis to setting where there
are more than two potential bidders, the cost of bidding is private information and lockups are
susceptible to misuse by unfaithful target management. Section 5 concludes.
2 The eﬀects of lockups on bidding competition
This section describes how alternative lockup measures aﬀect competitions once bidding begins.
In the process, we reevaluate Ayres’ irrelevance theorem when bidders are privately informed.
While the results derived here are of independent interest, they also form a basis for the analysis
of section 3, which considers the eﬀects of lockups on sequential participation of bidders.
To begin, consider two buyers, 1 and 2, competing to acquire the target firm, T . Our focus on
the two bidder case here and in the next section simplifies matters and it seems appropriate given
few takeovers involve more than two bidders.9 The target value under the existing management
8Stock lockups are preferred by target management from among the set of lockup measures commonly employed
in practice. Other processes such as discriminatory auctions with pre set reserve prices could produce even greater
surplus for the Target in theory. That such auctions aren’t used in practice suggests they might be illegal or diﬃcult
to implement.
9For instance Bradley et. al. (1988) report in their study of takeover contests that the vast majority of multiple
bidder acquisition involves just two buyers.
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is normalized to zero.10 Buyer i = 1, 2’s target valuation, vi, is distributed over Vi := [vi, vi],
with vi ≥ 0, according to a cdf Fi(·) which has positive density, fi(v), for v ∈ (vi, vi).11 We
assume the inverse hazard rate, hi(v) := (1− Fi(v))/fi(v), is decreasing in v ∈ Vi.12 Bidder i’s
private valuation vi is unknown to both the target and the rival bidder, who know only that
vi is distributed by fi(v). The bidders’ participation decisions preceding the competition may
well have led the parties to update their information. In this sense, Fi may be interpreted as
the updated posterior distribution formed at the beginning of the auction. The process whereby
bidders update their information based on their rival’s decision to participate is considered in
section 3.
We model the bidding competition as an ascending bid “clock” auction, in which the price
rises continuously and the last remaining bidder wins and pays the last exit price.13 Our model
mimics a formal auction proposed by the courts and legal analysts for takeover,14 but it is also
a reasonable depiction of the sequential negotiation/bidding arising among rival buyers. In our
model, bidder i = 1, 2’s strategy specifies the critical price, bi(v), as a function of his valuation,
at which he plans to exit, given that his opponent still remains in the competition. We assume
10For tractability we abstract from the possibility that the target has private information regarding its acqui-
sition value for a prospective buyer. See Fishman (1989) for an analysis of preemptive bidding and takeover in
such a setting.
11Buyers’ valuations vary because of the diﬀerent synergies they realize from acquiring the target’s assets.
Synergies created by the merging of the target with a prospective buyer vary according to the increase in market
share, strategic benefit, utilization of technology and corporate knowledge and the combining of complementary
assets arising from the merging of diﬀerent corporations.
12We extend the definition by letting hi(v) :=∞ for v < vi and hi(v) := 0 for v > vi.
13This implicitly assumes that the target is always transferred to the highest bidder. This assumption simplifies
the analysis of takeover auctions. However our qualitative results apply as well to cases in which the target sets
a reservation price suﬃciently high, so that takeover is precluded when bidders valuations are small. Here we
assume that vi is suﬃciently large so that it is revenue maximizing for the target to be acquired by one of the
buyers.
14 In some jurisdictions, most notably, Delaware, target management is required by law to behave as an auction-
eer would to solicit the highest tender price. For instance, the Delaware Courts which oversee the vast majority
of takeovers in the United States have ruled that ‘in a sale of corporate control the responsibility of directors is
to get the highest value reasonably attainable for shareholder. Further the directors’ role is to behave as auc-
tioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the Company.’ These passages are
paraphrased from Mills Acquisition Co.v. Macmillan Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989) and from Revlon Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173 182 (Del 1986). The choice of auctions over individual
negotiation is also supported by legal and institutional considerations (Bebchuk (1982), and Gilson (1982)) and
by economic theory (see Cramton and Schwartz (1991) and Bulow and Klemperer (1996)).
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the winning bidder is able to exit instantaneously at the losing bidder’s price.15 We focus on
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies. We will simply call the pair,
(b1(·), b2(·)), satisfying these properties “equilibrium bidding strategies."
Lockup provisions aﬀect equilibrium bidding strategies and allocation. Suppose bidder r =
1, 2 has received an lockup provision consisting of breakup fee τ ≥ 0 and stock lockup with share
μr ∈ [0, 1] for some strike price of v0. Total shares of the target are normalized to be one, and
μr is a fraction of the total shares. In the event the target is sold to buyer n 6= r, this lockup
arrangement entitles buyer r to a cash payment of τ r and to purchase μr shares at the strike
price of v0 and to resell them at the winning buyer’s bid price. Given a fixed strike price the
lockup arrangement is summarized by the pair (τ r, μr). Throughout, we assume the strike price
is suﬃciently small so v0 ≤ vi, i = 1, 2, implying that the recipient always wishes to exercise
the option. Further the lockup benefit is capped with τ r ≤ vn + μrv0, for r, n = 1, 2. While
these assumptions are made to simplify the analysis, they do not aﬀect our qualitative results.
Further, the assumptions are plausible in the takeover settings. Typically the strike price is very
low, and the value of total shares oﬀered for lockup constitutes a small percentage of the merger
price, perhaps to avoid the court’s scrutiny of the lockup provision.16
For i = 1, 2, let
Pi(bi) = total payment bidder i makes to the target (and to bidder j 6= i) if bidder i wins
the auction with a bid of bi.
Li(bj) = surplus bidder i receives when losing to buyer j with a bid of bj .
The eﬀect of a lockup provision (τ r, μr) is then summarized as follows.
Table 1: The eﬀect of lockup
15This “clock stopping feature” can then be seen as an endogenous tie-breaking rule that allows for existence
of an equilibrium.
16 If strike prices are not low enough, then the recipient may simply choose not to exercise the option when his
valuation is suﬃciently low. If τr > vn+μrv0, then the non-recipient may not participate when he has suﬃciently
low valuations. This will increase the foreclosing eﬀect of lockups. As will be clear, this is never in direct interest
of the target. Further, the possibility of exclusion due to this eﬀect does not appear to aﬀect the comparison of
the alternative lockup measures, which is the focus of the current paper.
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No Lockup Lockup with (τ , μ, v0)
Pr(br) br br
Lr(bn) 0 τ r + μr(bn − v0)
Pn(bn) bn bn + τ r + μr(bn − v0)
Ln(br) 0 0
Given the lockup provision (τ r, μr), the recipient simply pays his bid, br, if he wins. If he
loses, he receives the breakup fee τ r and the profit from exercising his stock option, μr(bn− v0).
Recall that the losing bidder’s bid, i.e., his exit price, becomes the price the winner pays, so
each exercised share yields a profit equalling the diﬀerence between the losing recipient’s bid and
the strike price. By contrast, the non-recipient bidder receives zero when he loses, and when he
wins, he pays τ r + μr(bn − v0) plus his bid bn.1718
The equilibrium bidding strategies can be characterized for an arbitrary lockup provision,
(τ r, μr), as follows. Suppose bj(·) induces a cdf Gj(·) of buyer j’s bid. Then, for any vi, bi(·),






(vi − Pi(b˜))dGj(b˜) + (1−Gj(bi))Li(bi). (1)
As we demonstrate below, stock lockups and breakups induce diﬀerent strategic responses from
bidders. Hence, we treat them separately, beginning with a case in which only breakup fees are
used.
2.1 Breakup fees (μr = 0)
It follows from Table 1 that, when μr = 0, bidder i’s winning surplus, vi − Pi(b˜), and losing
surplus, Li(bi), are independent of his bid, whether he receives a breakup fees or not. Hence,
diﬀerentiating (1) with respect to bi gives
∂πi(bi; vi)
∂bi
= ([vi − Pi(bi)]− Li(bi)) g (bi)
17Technically, the target makes the lockup payment, but the payment burden is ultimately shifted to the
eventual owner of the target.
18The lockup fees we analyze, restrict the target to oﬀering linear payments These payments reflect actual
provisions that are employed in practice. The eﬀect of allowing non linear payments would be to endow the
target with more powerful instruments for controling takeover. As a result the target could subsidize entry at a
lower cost and would therefore generate greater surplus from the sale of its assets. However, to attain maximum
surplus, would require the target to extract payments from the buyers prior to becoming informed, which is not
possible in practice.
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Since Pi(bi) is nondecreasing in bi and Li is constant, the derivative is nonincreasing in bi.
Therefore, buyer i’s payoﬀ is maximized at bi satisfying vi−Pi(bi) = Li(bi), or at bBi (vi) := vi−τ r
for i = 1, 2. That is, each buyer has a weak dominant strategy of continuing to bid until the price
reaches a level at which he is indiﬀerent to winning and losing. These results are summarized
as follows.
Proposition 1 In an ascending bid auction with a breakup fee τ r oﬀered to buyer r = 1, 2,
buyer i = 1, 2 with valuation vi bids
bB(vi) = vi − τ r,
and the target is allocated eﬃciently.
A breakup fee causes each buyer to bid below his value by the amount of the fee. This is
because the net value of acquiring the target is reduced by τ r for both buyers, for the non-
recipient buyer loses τ when he wins, whereas the recipient would lose τ if he wins. The
proposition also indicates that auctions with breakup fees are non-distortionary and eﬃcient, as
the highest valued bidder wins the auction.
The payoﬀ consequence of the breakup fee is also quite clear. Let πi(v1, v2; τ r, μr) denote
the equilibrium payoﬀ for party i = 0, 1, 2 from the ascending bid auction, when buyers 1 and
2 have (v1, v2) and buyer r has a lockup package of (τ r, μr). The case of no lockup is obtained
simply as corollary of Proposition 1, upon setting (τ r, μr) = (0, 0). With a positive breakup fee,
the bidders reduce their bids by τ r, so the allocation remains the same as when no lockup is
oﬀered. Hence, the breakup fee acts simply as a lump sum transfer of τ r from the target to the
recipient buyer:
Corollary 1 πr(v1, v2; τ r, 0) = πr(v1, v2; 0, 0) + τ r, πn(v1, v2; τ r, 0) = πn(v1, v2; 0, 0) and
π0(v1, v2; τ r, 0) = π0(v1, v2; 0, 0)− τ r.
Interestingly, the non-recipient buyer is unharmed by the breakup fee, as he receives the
same payoﬀ as if no breakup fee is employed. That breakup fees cannot be used as a method for
shifting rents from non-recipient buyer has important implications on the bidder participation
decision we analyze in the next section.
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2.2 Stock lockups (μr > 0)
Like breakup fees, a stock lockup provides its recipient with compensation in the event he fails
to acquire the target. This similarity has led many analysts to treat lockups and breakup fees
as equivalent. However, the stock lockup creates a new, and previously unrecognized, strategic
motive for the recipient buyer, which distinguishes it from breakup fees.
To begin, note that the non-recipient’s exit strategy does not aﬀect his relative payoﬀ from
winning; it only aﬀects the maximum price for which he will win the target. Hence, as with
breakup fees, the non-recipient has a weakly dominant strategy of continuing to bid until the




vn + μv0 − τ r
1 + μr
, (2)
unless buyer r exits before, in which case buyer n exits immediately thereafter.
By contrast, a stock lockup introduces a new strategic motive for the recipient, since his
bidding strategy aﬀects his compensation when he loses. The recipient’s bid eﬀectively sets the
price his rival pays when he loses, so the higher his losing bid is, the more profitable his option
becomes. Hence, the recipient has an incentive to continue bidding to raise the winning price in
case he loses the auction. Formally, the recipient’s losing surplus Lr(br) is an increasing function
of br (unlike breakup fees where losing surplus is independent of br). This feature implies the
recipient buyer has no weak dominant strategy.
To characterize the recipient’s equilibrium strategy, notice that by choosing br(·) the bidder
is eﬀectively choosing the marginal type of non-recipient to beat, φn(vr) := bLn
−1
(bLr (·)). Hence,
there is no loss in viewing the recipient as directly choosing φn(vr). We can thus rewrite the
equilibrium condition (1) for the recipient as:




(vr − Pr(bLn(vn)))dFn(vn) + (1− Fn(vˆn))Lr(bLn(vˆn)). (3)
The objective function in (3) is diﬀerentiable and quasi-concave in vˆn. Hence, buyer r’s equilib-
rium bidding strategy is characterized by the first-order condition, which upon substituting for
bLn(vn) from (2), simplifies to:





hn(φn(vr)) + λ1 − λ2 = 0, (4)
where (λ1, λ2) ≥ (0, 0) are the Lagrangian multipliers satisfying λ1(φ(vr)− vn) = 0 and λ2(vn−
φ(vr)) = 0, respectively. The equilibrium is therefore characterized as follows.
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Proposition 2 If μr > 0, there exists a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium (in undominated
strategies) in which the non-recipient buyer with vn bids
bLn(vn) =
vn + μrv0 − τ r
1 + μr
,







for vr ≤ φLr (vn),
φLn(vr)+μrv0−τr
1+μr
for vr ∈ [φLr (vn), φLr (vn)],
vn+μrv0−τr
1+μr
for vr ≥ φLr (vn),
where φLr (vn) = vn − (
μr
1+μr




(v). The target is ineﬃciently sold to the




A stock lockup causes the non-recipient buyer to bid lower than his value. His incentive to
acquire the target is diminished because he must compensate the recipient with stock lockup
benefits if he wins the auction. Thus, stock lockups are similar to breakup fees in this respect.
Stock lockups diﬀer from breakup fees in one important respect, however. Since the recipi-
ent’s losing compensation, Lr(b), increases with the non-recipient’s winning bid, the recipient is
motivated to bid more aggressively than his rival. This causes the recipient to win sometimes
when her rival places greater value on the target, thus resulting in an allocative distortion. In
particular, the recipient bidder never exits strictly before the lowest type of non-recipient does,
which results in the non-recipient with vn earning zero payoﬀ even when vn > vr. In fact, the
recipient bids more than his value when his valuation is low: given his slim chance of winning,
he simply raises his bid to force the non-recipient to pay greater lockup compensation when
he loses.19 Importantly, these two features imply that, unlike breakup fees, stock lockups shift
rents from the non-recipient to the recipient:
Corollary 2 Suppose that μr > 0 and that vr < vn. Then, πn(v1, v2; τ r, μr) ≤ πn(v1, v2; 0, 0)
and π0(v1, v2; τ r, μr)+πr(v1, v2; τ r, μr) ≥ π0(v1, v2; 0, 0)+πr(v1, v2; 0, 0) for all (v1, v2), and the
inequalities are strict for a set of (v1, v2) arising with positive probability. Further,
Evn [πr(v1, v2; τ r, μr)] ≥ Evn [πr(v1, v2; 0, 0)] for all vr.
19This finding runs counter to some court rulings which disallow stock lockups based on the argument that
lockups induce buyers to bid less, when a buyer may benefit from losing. See Fraidin and Hanson (1996, pages
1761-2).
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Proof. See the appendix.
As the corollary suggests, a stock lockup compensates the recipient at the expense of the
non-recipient. This will be seen to have important implications for the target’s choice of lockups
in inducing bidders to participate in the takeover contest.
2.3 The eﬀect of lockups on the target
How do lockups aﬀect the surplus generated when a takeover auction occurs? Can the target
increase shareholder revenue by favoring one of the buyers with a lockup? If so, what mix of
lockup instruments will it prefer to use? What is the social welfare consequence of, and the
regulatory implication for, lockups in general? We now address these questions, assuming that
the buyers always bid to acquire the target, or equivalently, bidder participation entails no cost.
Although the assumption of zero bidding cost is unrealistic, it enables us to isolate the eﬀect of
lockups on bidder competition. This case will also serve as a useful benchmark for our analysis
in the next section which will introduce nontrivial bidding costs.
The target’s lockup choice depends on the legal regime it operates under. Throughout, we
consider three legal regimes: (1) Regime N : the target is not allowed to oﬀer any lockup
provision; (2) Regime B : the target may oﬀer only breakup fees; and (3) Regime L: the target
may oﬀer breakup fees and stock lockups. Henceforth, we denote legal regimes by superscript
k = N,B,L. Our findings on the impact of lockups on bidder competition are summarized as
follows.
Proposition 3 Suppose that both buyers always participate in the auction.
(a) In regime B, the target will not oﬀer a breakup fee to either buyer, and the target is
allocated eﬃciently.
(b) In regime L, if the buyers are symmetric with F1(v) = F2(v) for all v, then the target will
not oﬀer any lockup to either buyer, in which case the allocation is eﬃcient. If hi(v) ≤ hj(v) for
all v and hi(v) < hj(v) for a positive measure of v, for i, j = 1, 2, then the target never oﬀers
a lockup to buyer j but it oﬀers a stock lockup to buyer i = 1, 2. The target allocation is then
distorted toward the recipient.
Proof. See Appendix.
Part (a) follows directly from Corollary 1, which implies that a breakup fee transfers resources
away from the target. Part (b) is a corollary of Myerson’s (1981) optimal auction design result,
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which suggests that handicapping (i.e., distorting allocation against) a bidder is optimal for the
auctioneer if the bidders are asymmetric (in the sense of the assumed hazard rate ranking) but
suboptimal if the bidders are symmetric. As we demonstrated in Proposition 2, a stock lockup
has the eﬀect of handicapping the non-recipient bidder. Hence, the target does not benefit from
stock lockups unless the bidders are asymmetric.
Since handicapping induces ineﬃcient takeover, the appropriate regulatory response would
be to permit only breakup fees. However, this conclusion presumes that buyer participation
in takeover is costless. We now turn to the issue of how lockup provision can be employed to
induce buyers with positive bidding costs to compete for the target.
3 Lockup eﬀects on bidder participation
To model the eﬀects of lockups on bidder participation, two important features of the corporate
takeover must be incorporated. First, preparing and initiating a takeover bid requires a sub-
stantial sunk investment for the prospective buyer. The investments are needed for identifying
and learning about the value of the target, and also include expenses for hiring lawyers and the
opportunity cost of cancelling or delaying the acquisition of another prospect while the buyer
bids for the target. Indeed, initial costs are often large, as the transactions costs of arranging
for financing and specifying an opening bid alone may equal several million dollars, often suﬃ-
cient to deter potential buyers from bidding for the target. Second, the bidder participation is
sequential, with one firm often initiating a bid to put the target in play, followed by subsequent
competition by another buyer. The sequential nature of bidder participation creates two strate-
gic problems. First, there may be informational externalities associated with the initial bidder’s
search investment, since the initial bid may reveal the common component of the buyers’ valu-
ations which later buyers may free ride on. This means the first bidder may be under-rewarded
for his investment. Second, as first recognized by Fishman (1988), the first bidder may wish to
preempt the subsequent bidder by credibly signaling that he has a suﬃciently high valuation.
Such preemption may stifle competition to the detriment of target shareholders. These two
eﬀects of sequential bidding, combined with substantial entry costs, suggests that lockups may
either be used as a subsidy to compensate the first bidder for the informational externalities he
provides, or to induce second bidder participation as a counter to preemptive bidding by the
first buyer.
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3.1 A model of sequential bidder participation
To proceed, we consider the following simple extension of our basic model. Again, there are two
buyers with own zero shares of the target. Buyer i’s valuation of the firm is θi = qvi, where
q ∈ {0, 1} is the common value component, and vi is buyer i’s private valuation of the firm. The
private values are independently and identically distributed by a cdf F (vi) with strictly positive
density, f(vi), for vi ∈ V ≡ [v, v]. Requiring private values to be symmetrically distributed helps
to reduce notation and simplify the analysis, though it is not required for most of our results.20
As before, the inverse hazard rate, h(v) := (1− F (v))/f(v) is assumed to be strictly decreasing
in v ∈ V . The value of the firm under current management is again zero. Clearly, takeover is
valuable only if q = 1 which arises with probability λ ∈ [0, 1]. The presence of the common value
component creates the potential for informational externalities mentioned above.
To initiate a bid, buyer i = 1, 2 must incur a sunk cost of ci > 0 to learn about target value
and prepare a bid. Subsequent bids are tendered at no additional cost.21 It is the presence of
bidder participation cost, along with the sequential nature of bidder participation, that renders
a lockup a valuation instrument for managing takeover competition.
The sequence of events follows the sequential takeover model of Fishman (1988), as described
in Figure 1.22
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
First, buyer 1 (henceforth B1) decides whether to invest c1 to determine the target value.
If he invests, he learns the value qv1. He can then initiate a bid no less than zero (the target
value under the current management).23 If he does not bid, the takeover process stops and the
game ends as the second buyer infers the target value is zero. If B1 does bid, and the target
accepts, takeover occurs at B1’s bid price. If the target (henceforth T) rejects the bid then buyer
2 (henceforth B2) decides whether to invest c2 and compete for the target. If B2 fails to bid,
20 In particular, the optimality of breakup fees does not depend on the symmetry. Symmetry matters only in
regime L, where it eliminates the need for a stock lockup as a handicapping device, noted in Proposition 3-(b).
21See Daniel and Hirshleifer (1993, 1995) for an interesting analysis of takeover bidding when rebidding is costly.
22See also Berkovitch and Khanna (1990), Bulow, Huang and Klemperer (1999) and Singh (1998) for a similar
model in their analyses of toeholds. These studies do not consider lockups.
23 In other words, the target firm cannot credibly demand an initial bid exceeding the market price of the firm.
We are thus assuming that management has limited ability to commit to a profit maximizing takeover process.
Management must entertain all qualified oﬀers to acquire the target and will sell to the highest bidder with an
oﬀer above the existing value of the firm. Any management behaving diﬀerently can be seen as violating its
fiduciary duty shareholders.
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then B1 acquires T at a zero bid (i.e., the market price of T). If B2 bids, the ascending auction
between B1 and B2 proceeds as described in the previous section. All sales are final and all
shareholders tender their shares at the winning bid price. Bidders are not allowed to withdraw
a winning bid, or to renegotiate with the target or the other buyer for the resale of T.
Unlike Fishman (1988), our objective is to analyze the role of lockups as an entry subsidy. We
assume lockups may be oﬀered immediately prior to each buyer making his investment decision.
T may oﬀer B1 a lockup prior to his investment decision, or it may oﬀer B2 a lockup prior to
his investment if it has not oﬀered B1 a lockup before. We assume, as is the practice, that the
target is not permitted to oﬀer lockups to multiple buyers simultaneously. Multi-party lockups
constitute a conflict of interest for the target and bidders, so they are unlikely to be enforceable.
In what follows, we analyze the eﬀects of lockups on the buyers’ participation decisions under
the legal regimes j = N,B,L, assuming as before that the target shareholders are collectively
represented by faithful board/management acting on their behalf.
In each regime, B1 may preempt by signaling his value to the subsequent bidder. As is well
known, signaling games typically have many equilibria. Following Fishman (1988), we focus on
the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium involving the most profitable outcome for B1. This equilibrium
selection is formally justified by Grossman and Perry (1986)’s credible belief refinement.24
3.2 Benchmark: socially eﬃcient takeover
Before proceeding, it is instructive to characterize the socially eﬃcient takeover behavior. Eﬃ-
cient takeover requires three conditions. First, the target must be allocated to the buyer with
highest value, conditional on both buyers having entered into competition. Second, B2 should
only enter into competition if the resulting expected increase in social surplus exceeds his entry
cost, c2. The net social gain from B2’s entry, given B1’s value is v1 = vˆ, is given by
Γ∗(vˆ) = E[max{v2 − vˆ, 0}]− c2 (5)
The function Γ∗(vˆ) is strictly decreasing in vˆ ∈ (v, v). In what follows, we focus on the interesting
case in which Γ∗(v) > 0 > Γ∗(v), so that there exists a socially eﬃcient threshold type vˆ∗
satisfying Γ∗(vˆ∗) = 0. The second requirement is that B2 should enter if and only if v1 < vˆ∗.
Finally, B1’s entry should be socially eﬃcient, assuming subsequent eﬃcient behavior. The net
24The credible belief requirement of Grossman and Perry (1986) restricts T’s and B2’s beliefs about which type
of B1 bidders would have selected a bid that is oﬀ the equilibrium path.
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social gain from B1’s entry is









which reflects takeover occurring only if q = 1. The third requirement is then B1 should enter if
and only if W ∗ ≥ 0. To focus on a nontrivial case, we assume throughout W ∗ ≥ 0. Given this
assumption, a socially eﬃcient takeover outcome requires B1 should always enter, B2 should
enter if and only if v1 < vˆ∗, and the target is allocated to the highest valued buyer among those
who have entered.
As will be seen shortly, socially eﬃcient takeover is unlikely to occur unless bidders are
somehow subsidized to overcome informational externalities and the preemption by the initial
bidder. This outcome would be even diﬃcult for government regulators to implement as they
would be required to know the bidders’ target valuations. Remarkably, we find the socially
eﬃcient outcome can be implemented under a plausible circumstance if the target is simply
restricted to employing breakup fees.
In the next two subsections, we consider in turn instances in which the second bidder is
oﬀered a lockup and ones in which the first bidder is oﬀered a lockup. The last subsection
analyzes the social and private implications of alternative legal regimes.
3.3 Second-bidder lockups
Consider the subgame in which B1 invests c1 without receiving a lockup from the target. Of
special interest is how the target may use a lockup to induce B2’s entry and how that aﬀects
B1’s bidding behavior.
Proceeding as in Fishman (1988) for a given legal regime j = N,B,L, we look for a sub-
game equilibrium (outcome) of the form: There exists a type vˆj ∈ [v, v] such that B1 makes
a preemptive jump bid of bˆj > 0 if v1 ≥ vˆj and a zero bid if v1 < vˆj ; The target accepts the
former and rejects the latter bid. Rejection results in B2 entering without a lockup, triggering
an ascending auction. (The possibility B1 never preempts regardless of v1 is incorporated in
this characterization with vˆj ≡ v.) Below, we invoke necessary conditions for equilibrium to pin
down vˆj and bˆj , and to establish that an equilibrium of this form exists. In so doing, we focus
on the case with vˆj < v; i.e., preemption occurs with positive probability in equilibrium. If no
equilibrium can satisfy this condition, then preemption never occurs in equilibrium.
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Suppose first that B1 makes a non-preemptive bid. This implies the updated distribution of
B1’s type becomes F1(v) = min{F (v)/F (vˆj), 1} for v ∈ R+ while the distribution of B2’s type
remains unupdated at F2(·) = F (·). Observe for v ∈ [v, vˆj ], h1(v) = F (vˆ
j)−F (v)
f(v) ≤ h(v) = h2(v).
Hence, by Proposition 3-(b), the T will never oﬀer B2 a lockup even in regime L, just as in
the presumed candidate equilibrium. The ensuing ascending auction will then play out just as
described in Proposition 1 with τ = 0. Consequently, if the threshold type vˆj were to make a
non-preemptive bid, then it would receive E[max{vˆj − v2, 0}]. If that type makes a preemptive
bid bˆj instead, then its payoﬀ would be vˆj − bˆj . In equilibrium, these two payoﬀs must coincide
as the threshold type must be indiﬀerent to preempting and competing in the auction.25 Hence,
letting
bˆ(vˆ) := vˆ − E[max{vˆ − v2, 0}] = E[min{vˆ, v2}],
in equilibrium we must have
bˆj = bˆ(vˆj). (7)
Suppose next that vˆj = vˆ and that B1 makes a preemptive bid of bˆj = bˆ(vˆ). The target then
decides whether to accept or reject it based on updated beliefs, F1(v) = max{{[F (v)−F (vˆ)]/[1−
F (vˆ) }, 0} and F2(·) = F (·). Of course, his decision will depend on the continuation play that
would follow if he rejects the bid. Let Πi(τ2, μ2 | vˆ) := E[πi(v1, v2; τ2, μ2) | v1 ≥ vˆ] denote
the equilibrium payoﬀ of party i = 0, 1, 2 from an ascending auction game where B2 receives a
lockup of (τ2, μ2) and the posterior is given by (F1(·), F2(·)). Then, the target’s benefit from
rejecting bˆ(vˆ) in regime j, Γj(vˆ), is described as follows.
In regime N, the target cannot subsidize entry, so B2 will enter if his payoﬀ Π2(0, 0|vˆ) exceeds
entry cost c2. If B2 enters, then T receives Π0(0, 0|vˆ). Otherwise, T receives the minimum bid
of zero from B1. Hence, the net benefit from rejecting bˆ(vˆ) is
ΓN(vˆ) =
(
Π0(0, 0|vˆ)− bˆ(vˆ) if Π2(0, 0|vˆ) ≥ c2,
0 otherwise.
In regimes B and L, T may subsidize B2 with a lockup, so the net benefit from rejecting bˆ(vˆ) is
the highest payoﬀ T realizes, net of bˆ(vˆ), subject to inducing B2 to enter:
Γj(vˆ) =
(
maxτ2{Π0(τ2, 0|vˆ)− bˆ(vˆ) s.t. Π2(τ2, 0|vˆ) ≥ c2} if j = B,
maxτ2μ2{Π0(τ2, μ2|vˆ)− bˆ(vˆ) s.t. Π2(τ2, μ2|vˆ) ≥ c2} if j = L.
25Clearly, the latter payoﬀ must be no less than the former since the type vˆj is presumed to bid bˆj ; if the latter
payoﬀ exceed the former, however, a type slightly less than vˆj will wish to preempt, which contradicts the fact
that vˆj is the threshold type.
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In the presumed equilibrium with threshold value vˆj , the target must always accept the bid
bˆj = bˆ(vˆj), which requires Γj(vˆj) ≤ 0. In particular, for the most profitable signaling equilibrium,
vˆj is the smallest type for which T accepts the bid, or
vˆj = inf{vˆ | Γj(vˆ) ≤ 0}, (8)
whenever the set is nonempty. (If the set is empty, then preemption never occurs.) We now
demonstrate that (7) and (8) are necessary and suﬃcient for the most profitable signaling equi-
librium.
Lemma 1 Fix a legal regime j = N,B,L. In the subgame following B1’s investment and
realization of q = 1, there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with most profitable signaling for
B1, with the following properties:
(i) If Γj(vˆ) > 0 for all vˆ ∈ [v, v], then B1 bids zero regardless of his type, T rejects the bid
and does not oﬀer a lockup to B2, who enters and triggers an ascending auction that allocates
the target to the highest valued bidder.
(ii) If Γj(vˆ) = 0 for some vˆ ∈ [v, v], then B1 bids zero if v1 ∈ [v, vˆj) and bˆj(vˆi) if v1 ∈ [vˆj , v],
where vˆj and bˆj satisfy (8) and (7). T accepts bˆj and rejects the zero bid whereupon B2 enters
without a lockup and triggers an ascending bid auction, that allocates the target to the highest
valued bidder.
In each regime, either B1 preempts and acquires the target outright, or an auction without
lockups arises and allocates the target eﬃciently. In either case, lockups are never employed on
the equilibrium path. This does not imply that lockups have no impact on the subgame outcome.
Rather, it is the ability of T to oﬀer lockups in each regime that determines the likelihood of
preemption, as indexed by vˆj ; the ability to oﬀer lockups aﬀects the target’s out-of-equilibrium
threat to defeat B1’s preemptive bidding.
Clearly preemption is socially desirable when v1 is suﬃciently large, since B2’s entry is costly
and his value v2 is unlikely to exceed v1. We now characterize the degrees of preemption arising
in alternative legal regimes and compare them against the eﬃcient preemption level.
Proposition 4 vˆN < vˆB = vˆ∗ < vˆL. That is, equilibrium preemption by B1 is socially eﬃcient
if the target may only oﬀer breakup fees, whereas there is too much preemption if the target
is prohibited from any lockups, and too little preemption if the target is allowed to oﬀer stock
lockups.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
To gain more intuition, consider regime N first. In this regime, T’s benefit from competition,
Π0(0, 0|vˆ) = E[min{v1, v2}|v1 ≥ vˆ], exceeds B1’s preemptive bid, bˆ(vˆ) = E[min{vˆ, v2}], so the
target prefers to reject B1’s preemptive bid whenever B2 would enter without a lockup. This
also means that, in regime j = B,L, the target will wish to oﬀer a lockup to subsidize B2’s
entry whenever he would not enter on his own. Consequently, preemption will be less likely in
regimes B and L, compared with regime N.
In regimes B and L, B2’s lockup will be just suﬃcient to allow B2 to break even after entry.
This will enable T to extract all of the joint surplus of the target and B2. T will therefore induce
B2’s entry with a lockup whenever it is jointly profitable for T and B2. As noted in Corollaries
1 and 2, a breakup fee subsidizes the recipient without harming the non-recipient whereas a
stock lockup shifts rents to its recipient from the non-recipient. This rent-shifting feature of a
stock lockup means the cost of subsidizing B2’s entry is lower in regime L. Thus the target will
be more strongly motivated to induce entry in regime L, resulting in a less preemption in that
regime, than in regime B.
Remarkably, the equilibrium preemption in regime B is socially eﬃcient. To see this, observe
that, when B2 enters, T and B2’s joint surplus, Π0(τ2, 0|vˆ) +Π2(τ2, 0|vˆ)− c2, equals E[v2]− c2.
(If the target is sold to B2, the joint surplus is v2. If it is sold to B1, it will be at the price
of v2 − τ2 but B1 pays τ2 to B2, so again the joint surplus is v2.) Since, by inducing B2 to
enter, the target will have to forego the preemptive bid bˆ(vˆ) = E[min{vˆ, v2}], its net gain from
rejecting the latter bid is
ΓB(vˆ) = E[v2]− E[min{vˆ, v2}]− c2 = E[max{v2 − vˆ, 0}]− c2 = Γ∗(vˆ). (9)
That is, permitting the target to use only breakup fees induces it to internalize the net social
benefit from inducing additional competition.
Since the target is eﬃciently allocated once an auction begins, the social welfare and the
parties’ equilibrium payoﬀs realized in the alternative regimes can be compared by inspecting
their threshold types.
Corollary 3 Let U ji denote party i = 0, 1, 2’s ex ante equilibrium payoﬀ (gross of B1’s entry
cost) and let W j denote the associated social welfare, in regime j = N,B,L, when B1 initiates
takeover without a lockup.
WB =W ∗ > max{WN ,WL}, UL0 > UB0 > UN0 and UL1 < UB1 < UN1 .
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Once B1 submits an initial bid for the target, stock lockups are socially undesirable since
they entail excessive entry and wasteful expenditure on bid preparation. Yet, target share-
holders prefer them over breakup fees since they induce greater bidding competition. Hence,
shareholders’ interests diverge from the maximization of social welfare in this instance. This
corollary contrasts with current legal theory which does not distinguish between diﬀerent lockup
arrangements based on their social eﬃciency properties. But this finding is broadly consistent
with current legal practice which requires a higher standard of proof for target management to
employ stock lockups than breakup fees.
Remark 1 The eﬃciency property of breakup fees extends beyond the setting of our model.
For instance, the arguments demonstrating the eﬃciency of breakup fees do not depend on the
distribution of the buyers’ valuations. (Note that the eﬃcient auction allocation is supported by
the use of weak dominant strategies by the buyers and the eﬃcient preemption behavior above
clearly does not depend on the distribution of valuations.) Hence, the breakup fees admit socially
eﬃcient takeover behavior even when buyers draw valuations from asymmetric distributions.
Remark 2 In regimes B and L, lockups are never actually employed in equilibrium.26 Rather,
the credible threat of using them deters B1 from preempting when his valuation is not suﬃciently
high. At first glance, this feature may appear to be consistent with with Kahan and Klausner’s
(1996) claim that second buyers require no subsidies to compete when it is socially desirable
for them to bid. Nonetheless, the option for the target to employ breakup fees is necessary for
eﬃcient takeover.27
3.4 First-bidder lockups
The previous subsection considered the setting where B1 initiates takeover without a lockup
(i.e., τ1 = μ1 = 0). We now suppose B1 initiates takeover with lockup (τ1, μ1) > (0, 0). Recall
26 In equilibrium, lockups aren’t observed, as B1 is certain as to the reactions of T to any oﬀer it makes. However,
lockups might be employed in equilibrium if B1 were uncertain about T’s reaction to a preemptive bid. In some
instances, T might subsidize the entry of B2 against a preemptive bid, if the cost was lower than expected, or if
the benefits were greater than expected.
27As with many types of strategic instruments, the perceived benefit of breakup fees is likely to be understated,
since it is the option of being able to use them that has real value, not their actual implementation. See the
interesting analysis of Berkovitch and Khanna (1990) who demonstrate the deterrence eﬀect of value reducing
defensive measures in discouraging peremptory bids.
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oﬀering B1 a lockup commits T not to oﬀer B2 a lockup, so τ2 = μ2 = 0.
In regime j = B,L, as before, we consider an equilibrium where B1 either makes a preemptive
bid of b˜j if v1 ≥ v˜j or a non-preemptive bid of zero if v1 < v˜j . In the latter case, an ascending
auction arises, with the beliefs updated to F1(·) = min{F (·)/F (v˜j), 1} and F2(·) = F (·).
Let U˜ ji (τ1, μ1) and W˜ (τ1, μ1) denote party i = 0, 1, 2’s payoﬀ (gross of B1’s entry cost) and ex
ante social welfare, respectively, in regime j = N,B,L when B1 initiates takeover with a lockup
of (τ1, μ1). Consistent with the previous section, we denote U˜ j(0, 0) = U j and W˜ j(0, 0) = W j
for j = N,B,L and require μ1 = 0 for j = N,B and τ1 = 0 for j = N.
Now consider regime j = B,L as regime N has been analyzed above. Following previous
arguments, in equilibrium, B1 with the threshold type v˜j < v must be indiﬀerent to preempting,
which implies that
Ev2 [π1(v˜j , v2; τ1, μ1)] = v˜j − b˜j . (10)
Furthermore, since B2 cannot be oﬀered a lockup, preemption can succeed if and only if
Π2(τ1, μ1|v˜j) ≤ c2.
In the equilibrium with the most profitable signaling for B1, we must have
v˜j = inf{v ∈ [v, v]|Π2(τ1, μ1|v˜j)− c2 ≤ 0}. (11)
As before, the equilibrium is characterized by a pair (v˜j , b˜j) satisfying (10) and (11).
First consider regime B. Recall from Corollary 1 Π2(τ1, 0 | v˜) = Π2(0, 0 | v˜) for all v˜.
Hence, Π2(τ1, 0 | v˜) − c2 > 0 if and only if ΓN(vˆ) > 0, implying that v˜B = vˆN . That is,
equilibrium preemption following (τ1, 0) coincides with that when the target oﬀers no lockup to
either buyer. Corollary 1 also implies π1(v˜, v2; τ1, 0) = π1(v˜, v2; 0, 0) + τ1 = min{v˜ − v2, 0}+ τ1
for all v˜, v2. Substituting this into (10), along with the fact v˜B = vˆN , reveals b˜B = bˆN − τ1 =
E[min{vˆN , v2}] − τ1. Combined with Corollary 1, this implies a breakup fee of τ1 oﬀered to
B1 serves as a lump-sum transfer from the target without changing the allocation of the target,
relative to when no lockup is oﬀered to either buyer. This also implies U˜B0 (τ1, 0) = U
N
0 − τ1
and W˜B(τ1, 0) =WN .
Now consider regime L. With μ1 > 0, Corollary 2 implies Ev2 [π1(v˜, v2; τ1, μ1)] ≥ Ev2 [π1(v˜, v2; 0, 0)]
and Π2(τ1, μ1 | v˜) < Π2(0, 0 | v˜). Applying these facts to (10) and (11), we conclude
v˜L < vˆN and b˜L < bˆN .
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Oﬀering B1 a stock lockup has a greater foreclosing eﬀect on B2 than oﬀering no lockup. It also
follows that U˜L0 (τ1, μ1) < U
N
0 and W˜
L(τ1, μ1) < WN if μ1 > 0, as will be demonstrated below.
Lemma 2 Suppose B1 initiates takeover with (τ1, 0), τ1 > 0. Then, preemption occurs if
v1 ≥ v˜B = vˆN ; otherwise, B2 enters and the target is allocated eﬃciently, so T receives UN0 −τ1,
and social welfare equals WN . Suppose B1 initiates takeover with (τ1, μ1), μ1 > 0. Then,
preemption occurs if v1 ≥ v˜L where v˜L < vˆN ; otherwise, B2 enters and triggers an auction
which allocates the target ineﬃciently in favor of B1. The associated target payoﬀ and welfare
level, denoted U˜L0 (τ1, μ1) and W˜
L(τ1, μ1), are strictly less than UN and WN , respectively.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Now we are ready to analyze B1’s entry decision and the possible lockup T may oﬀer to
B1 prior to his entry. Lemma 2 shows that in each regime the target only wishes to oﬀer B1 a
lockup to induce his entry. In regime j = N,B,L, B1 would receive λU j1 − c1 from investing c1




1 . The entry decision in each
regime will depend on the cost of entry, c1, relative to λU
j
1 .
Proposition 5 (a) In regime N, if c1 ≤ λUN1 , then B1 invests and the social welfare realized
is WN < W ∗. If c1 > λUN1 , B1 does not invest and takeover never occurs.
(b) In regime B, if c1 ≤ λUB1 , then B1 invests without a lockup, and an eﬃcient takeover arises
with realized social welfare, WB = W ∗. If λUB1 < c1 ≤ λE[v1], then B1 invests with a
breakup fee, and the resulting welfare level is WN . If c1 > λE[v1], then B1 does not invest
and takeover never occurs.
(c) In regime L, if c1 ≤ λUL1 , B1 invests without a lockup, and the realized welfare level isWL <
W ∗. If λUL1 < c1 ≤ λUN1 , B1 invests with an arbitrarily small lockup (of either kind), with
resulting welfare WN < W ∗. If λUN1 < c1 ≤ ∆L := maxτ1,μ1 λ[U˜0(τ1, μ1) + U˜1(τ1, μ1)],
B1 invests with a lockup of μ1 > 0, and the social welfare becomes W˜L(c1) < WN . If
c1 > ∆L, B1 never invests and there is no takeover.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 5 suggests that the availability of lockups facilitates initial takeover bidding. In
particular, the rent shifting feature of the stock lockup enables T to subsidize B1’s entry at
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lower cost, so B1’s entry can be supported even when its entry cost is substantially high. Since
the target does not internalize the benefit B2 would enjoy from B1’s investment, whenever B1
is induced to enter, it is socially desirable.
While stock lockups can subsidize the initial takeover bid more eﬀectively than the breakup
fees, they tend to generate more distortion in the later stage, entailing too little preemption (in
case they are not oﬀered to B1) or too much preemption (in case they are oﬀered to B1). For
this reason, regime B is likely to dominate regime L in a broad set of circumstances. In fact,
the possibility of a stock lockup being oﬀered to B2 reduces B1’s incentive to invest if no lockup
is oﬀered to him. For instance, if λUL1 < c1 ≤ λUB1 , B1 would not invest without a lockup
in regime L, although he would invest without a breakup fee in regime B. This problem will
disappear if stock lockup can be oﬀered only to the first bidder (and only a breakup fee can
be oﬀered to the second bidder), somewhat in the same spirit as Kahan and Klausner (1996).
We label such a legal regime L0. Permitting stock lockups only for the first bidder need not
be desirable, however, due to the allocative distortion and increased likelihood of preemption
against the second bidder. We conclude our formal analysis below with a comparison of welfare
in diﬀerent regimes.
3.5 Comparing regimes
The equilibrium welfare levels attainable under alternative legal regimes implied by Proposition
5 are described in the following table.
Table 2: Welfare Consequences of Alternative Legal Regimes
c1 ≤ λUL1 λUL1 < c1 ≤ λUB1 λUB1 < c1 ≤ λUN1 λUN1 < c1 ≤ λE[v1] λE[v1] < c1 ≤ ∆L
N WN WN WN 0 0
B W ∗ W ∗ WN WN 0
L WL WN WN W˜L(c1) W˜L(c1)
L0 W ∗ W ∗ WN W˜L(c1) W˜L(c1)
The comparison follows simply from the fact that W ∗ > WN ,WL ≥ 0 and that WN >
W˜L(c1) ≥ 0.
Proposition 6 (a) Regime B dominates regime N, and strictly so if c1 ≤ λUB1 or λUN1 < c1 ≤
λE[v1].
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(b) Regime B dominates regime L if c1 ≤ λE[v1], and strictly so if c1 ≤ λUB1 or λUN1 < c1 ≤
λE[v1]; Regime L dominates regime B strictly if λE[v1] < c1 ≤ ∆L.
(c) Regime L0 dominates regime L, and strictly so if c1 ≤ λUB1 .
(d) Regime B dominates regime L0 if λUN1 < c1 ≤ λE[v1], but regime L0 dominates regime B if
λE[v1] < c1 ≤ ∆L.
There are several noteworthy aspects of this welfare comparison. First, permitting the target
to at least oﬀer breakups is preferred to outlawing all lockups. In fact, one can implement the
first best with this policy if the first buyer’s bidding cost is not too large (c1 ≤ λUB1 ). Second,
permitting the target to oﬀer a stock lockup can support some takeover activity even when the
bidding cost is high and/or the informational externalities problem is severe. Nonetheless this
policy may be dominated by permitting only breakup fees, as stock lockups induce either too
much competition (when c1 ≤ λUL1 ) or too little competition (when λUB1 < c1 ≤ λUN1 and
λUN1 < c1 ≤ λE[v1]). Third, permitting a stock lockup to be oﬀered only to the first bidder (i.e.,
regime L0) combines the benefit of regimes B and L, and thus dominates regime L. However this
policy is worse than permitting only breakup fees if the first bidder would participate with a
breakup fee alone.
4 Extensions
This section sketches out extensions of our analysis to some diﬀerent settings.28
4.1 Multiple Second Bidders
Our findings about the optimality of breakup fees and the aﬀects of lockups extend to settings
where there are any number of bidders. To illustrate, suppose there are N > 2 bidders, 1, 2, ..., N
who have the same private value distribution but diﬀerent costs of entry, ci, that is ordered so
that ci ≤ ci+1, for all i. The eﬃcient takeover then involves a sequential process whereby each
buyer makes an entry decision according to the indexed order, with buyer n = 1, ..., N incurring
cn to enter if and only if the highest valuation among the previous entrants is less than some
threshold value v∗n. The threshold value declines monotonically with the buyer index, given that
a lower indexed buyer has a lower cost. This eﬃcient process can be implemented by a target
28A detailed analysis of some these extensions are available from the authors upon request.
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that is allowed to use breakup fees to subsidize entry. This result holds in a model of sequential
takeover bidding that extends the basic model in Section 3 (with the time line described in
Figure 1), where the target approaches the buyers in the order she chooses.
The bargaining process is formally described as follows. The target approaches the buyers in
the indexed order. Suppose all buyers 1, ..., (n−1) have made their entry decisions, and buyer n
is about to make an entry decision. We call such a stage round n. Let b˜I be the current standing
bid, equal to the highest amount that has been bid by any buyer up to this point, and let I be
the “incumbent" who made that bid. We call that (n, b˜I) a state. The following bidding game
is played in that state.
Sequential Bidding Process:
(i) I bids b¯I ≥ b˜I to acquire T . If T accepts, the process ends. If T rejects the bid or
he may oﬀer a fee τn ≥ 0 to buyer Bn to enter the bidding. If Bn refuses then the state
becomes (n + 1, b˜I and the process starts over again at (i) in round n + 1. If buyer n
accepts oﬀer he incurs a cost cn and learns his value, vn.
(ii) Buyers n and I compete in an ascending bid auction to determine which buyer becomes
the new incumbent. The bidding begins at b˜I , the current standing oﬀer.
(iii) The last bidder remaining becomes the new incumbent and the new winning bid
becomes the new standing bid, b˜0I .
(iv) The process returns to (i) in round n+ 1 with state (n+ 1, b˜0I) where it begins once
again.
The process begins initially in state (1, 0) in round 1. The process terminates when T accepts
a bid, or with the conclusion of the ascending bid in round N . This process results in the eﬃcient
allocation of the target to the highest valued buyer who competes. Moreover, the preemption
behavior by an incumbent bidder (i.e., the bidder with the highest valuation among those who
have entered) is also eﬃcient in that an incumbent bidder preempts subsequent entry if and only
if his valuation exceeds the eﬃcient threshold v∗n in round n. This process determines the highest
valued buyer in the same way the two buyer case works. At each stage, the incumbent buyer’s
bid signals whether her value is a high enough one to preempt entry by further buyers, or a low
enough value to warrant entry by the next potential buyer in line. Just as in the two buyer case,
25
breakup fees enable the target to internalize the joint surplus of the subsequent entrants, thus
leading to the eﬃcient preemption behavior.29
4.2 Uncertain entry costs
Our main findings regarding the benefit of breakup fees extend to the setting where B2’s costs are
private and uncertain to T and B1. We sketch the arguments here; more detailed explanations
are available from the authors. To illustrate, suppose B2’s cost c2 is c or c with probabilities
p and 1 − p, where 0 < c < c. B2 privately observes his cost c2 prior to bidding. Uncertain
entry cost of B2 changes the socially eﬃcient entry/preemption. It is characterized by two
threshold types of bidder 1, v∗L and v
∗
H in [v, v], such that bidder 2 should never enter (no entry)
if v1 ∈ A = (v∗H , v¯]; he should enter only when c = c (“partial entry") if v1 ∈ B = (v∗L, v∗H); and
he should always enter if v1 ∈ C = [v, v∗L] . Clearly, the threshold must satisfy,
Ev2 [max{v2 − v∗H , 0}] = c (12)
Ev2 [max{v2 − v∗L, 0}] = c. (13)
Without any lockups (i.e, in regime N), B1’s preemptive bidding equilibrium will also have






H) such that B1 with
v1 > vNH makes a high bid b
N
H which preempts both types of B2; B1 with v1 ∈ (vNL , vNH ) makes
lower partially-preemptory bid which deters entry by only low high cost type B2; and B1 with
v1 < vNL makes non-preemptory zero bid, leading to entry by both types of B1. For the precisely






Breakup fees improve the eﬃciency of entry decision for much of the same reason as before;
namely, the ability by T to credibly threaten to subsidize B2’s entry disciplines B1’s preemptory
power. But the full eﬃciency is not achieved, unlike the case with no uncertainty. In regime
B, the preemptive bidding equilibrium is again characterized by two threshold types and two






H), with type v1 > v
N
H of B1 making full preemptory bid b
N
H , type
v1 ∈ (vNL , vNH ) making partial preemptory bid, and type v1 < vNL making non-preemptory bid.
As before, the threat of oﬀering breakup fees influenced the preemption behavior, but breakup
29This process also accommodates cases in which the buyers also diﬀer in their private value distributions, as
well as costs. See the supplementary notes available from the authors.
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fees are never used on the equilibrium path, despite the uncertainty about B2’s entry cost.
The reason is that T and B1 have symmetric information about B2, which means that on the
equilibrium path both parties have same belief about exactly what is required for T to accept
B1’s preemptive bid.
The resulting entry behavior is more eﬃcient than in regime N. To begin, the threshold
for the partial preemption is eﬃcient with vBL = v
∗
L. The logic for this is the same as before:
Equilibrium requires B1 with the threshold type to be indiﬀerent between no preemption and
partial preemption; and T becomes residual claimants of the surplus associated with the two
options, partial entry and (subsidized) full entry, and must be indiﬀerent in equilibrium. The
same is not true with the threshold for the full preemption, as it is excessive with vBH < v
∗
H .
The reason is T is unable to capture the full residual surplus from partial preemption when it
deviates and subsidizes only the low cost type. In the latter case, if B2 were indeed of high cost,
he will not respond to T’s oﬀer, and T gets no payoﬀ, instead of the bid bBL B1 would have oﬀered
if he had opted to partially preempt. While type vBH is indiﬀerent between full preemption and
partial preemption, T is not entitled to the residual surpluses associated with the two options
at the time of its choice. This inability to capture full residual surplus from partial preemption
leads to excessive preemption in this case. This ineﬃciency notwithstanding, regime B produces
a strictly more eﬃcient entry behavior than regime N, for vBH ≥ vNH . In this sense, the main
tenet of this paper remains valid.
4.3 Unfaithful management
To this point our analysis presumes a faithful target management representing shareholder inter-
est in managing the takeover. In practice, however, a target management may act to maximize
their private benefit from retaining control of the company or from “steering” the target to a
sympathetic buyer willing to treat existing management preferentially. Some analysts question
the prudency of allowing lockups of any kind in view of management’s potential for abusing
shareholder interests.
All lockups may be misused by management for their private gain. However, the extent of
misuse varies with diﬀerent lockup provisions. While a full accounting of lockup abuse is not
possible here, our findings suggest at least that breakup fees are less susceptible than stock
lockups to misuse by a management seeking private gains from takeover. This follows because
breakup fees cannot be employed to either distort the outcome of bidder competition or to
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shift rents from an unfavored bidder to a favored one. Our analysis indicates that once an
ascending auction begins, the high valuation bidder always wins, regardless of the breakup fees
management has oﬀered. Further, provided the size of breakup fees is appropriately capped, a
breakup fee oﬀered to an initial bidder can not discourage additional bidders from competing
for the target.30
In considering the possible misuse of a breakup fee, it is instructive to consider three cases.
First imagine an “entrenched” board that is opposed even to a profitable takeover. It is reason-
able to assume that even such a board will seek to maximize revenue once a takeover becomes
inevitable. With such a board, the policy of permitting only breakup fees (“regime B”) domi-
nates prohibiting all lockups (“regime N”), both from a social welfare and share holder viewpoint.
In both regimes, the board will not solicit initial takeover bids. However, if a buyer seriously
bids to acquire the target, making takeover inevitable, the board will optimally employ breakup
fees to solicit other bids to increase the revenue from the takeover in regime B. By contrast, in
regime N, the board would be unable to induce suﬃcient competition for the target.
Next imagine the board prefers takeover by a particular buyer. Here the board may oﬀer
the favored bidder a breakup fee in regime B, but this option is precluded in regime N. Further,
oﬀering the favored buyer a breakup fee (with an appropriate cap) will not discourage additional
bidders from entering the competition. Hence, social welfare and shareholder revenues are at
least as great in regime B relative to regime N.
Finally imagine the board is biased against a bidder who already has initiated a hostile
takeover. In regime B, the target board will oﬀer a breakup fee to induce further bidding by a
white knight whereas this option is precluded in regime N. As before, oﬀering a second bidder a
breakup fee will not discourage the hostile bid in the first place. Hence, again the breakup fee
is desirable.
In principle, a breakup fee restricted not to exceed the cost of bid preparation would suﬃce
to insure they are properly employed. Whether courts would possess suﬃcient knowledge of
bidding costs to set appropriate breakup fee caps is debatable. Nonetheless, it seems clear
that allowing conservatively capped breakup fees would be preferable in most cases to banning
lockups all together.
Unlike breakup fees, stock lockups appear susceptible to a misuse by an unfaithful board.
In particular, the ability of a stock lockup to shift rents away from non-recipient bidders can
30As we noted earlier, if breakup fees are less than v, they do not aﬀect the payoﬀs of non-recipient bidders.
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make it an eﬀective device for manipulating the outcome of takeover, if the (unfaithful) board
so wishes. For instance, an “entrenched" target board can fend oﬀ, or even prevent, a hostile
takeover attempt, by threatening to oﬀer a stock lockup to a “white knight" favorable to the
board. Such a threat is much more credible and eﬀective than that of using a breakup fee,
since stock lockups enable the target board to shift the burden of subsidizing competition to the
hostile bidder.
5 Conclusion
Our analysis reveals some form of lockups is required to induce suﬃcient competition in takeover
contests, and to compensate first buyers for initiating acquisitions. A widespread ban of lockups
by the courts would, we believe, unduly inhibit the takeover process. The courts should be at
least permissive towards the target’s use of breakup fees. When management acts to maximize
shareholder value from takeover, we find breakup fees induce eﬃcient allocation of the target
to the highest valued buyer in a takeover auction. Further, employing breakup fees to subsidize
bidding increases the eﬃciency of entry decisions of initial and follow-on buyers, relative to
settings where all lockups are prohibited. In addition, the desirable properties of breakup fees
appear to extend even to situations where the target board is unfaithful to the shareholder
interests as we have argued in the previous section.
By contrast, stock lockups reduce the social surplus from acquisitions by permitting recipient
buyers with lower valuations to acquire the target. Further, a second-buyer stock lockup will
encourage too much competition, whereas a first-buyer lockup will cause excessive preemption of
second bidders, thus inducing too little competition. Despite the ineﬃciencies, we predict target
management would prefer to employ stock lockups unless discouraged by the courts.31 Stock
lockups permit the target to induce buyers to participate at lower cost by favoring the recipient
buyer at the expense of other rival bidders. We expect this preference for stock lockups to be
even more pronounced among unfaithful target boards desiring to retain control of the target or
to bias takeover in favor of an accommodating buyer. Since stock lockups reduce takeover rents
of non-recipients, they may be employed by an unfaithful board to defeat a takeover attempt.
Our findings suggest that courts should encourage the use of breakup fees in place of stock
lockups to manage the takeover process.
31As mentioned earlier, the courts’ more lenient treatment of breakup fees appears largely responsible for the
less frequent use of stock lockups. See Coates and Subramanian (2000).
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Corollary 2. The last inequality holds since the recipient with vr could bid vr+μv0−τ1+μ
and win against the same types of buyer n as when (τ r, μr) = (0, 0, ) and thus secure at least
the same expected payoﬀ, but he can do better with his equilibrium strategy.
The second inequality is proven as follows. Observe first that the joint payoﬀ of the target
and the recipient with valuation vr is simply vr when (τ r, μr) = (0, 0), since when the latter
wins the realized surplus for the coalition is vr and when he loses the other bidder pays vr. Now
suppose μr > 0. If the recipient wins, then the realized surplus for the coalition is again vr, but
when he loses, the coalition collects the total payment from the non-recipient with valuation vn,
equal to
br(vr) + τ r + μr(br(vr)− v0) = max{φLn(vr), vn},
which is strictly greater than vr. This proves the second inequality for all (v1, v2). The inequality
is strict whenever the non-recipient would have won with (τ r, μr) = (0, 0), which is a positive
probability event, given vr < vn.
The first inequality (weak and strict) follows directly from the first since
π0(v1, v2; 0, 0)+πr(v1, v2; 0, 0)+πn(v1, v2; 0, 0) ≥ π0(v1, v2; τ r, μr)+πr(v1, v2; τ r, μr)+πr(v1, v2; τ r, μr),
where the inequality holds since the allocation is eﬃcient when (τ r, μr) = (0, 0) (see Proposition
1).
Proof of Proposition 3. Part (a) follows directly from Corollary 1. Part (b) follows from
the revenue equivalence argument, which enables us to express the target’s expected surplus
given (τ r, μr), as a function of the equilibrium allocation, φi(vj) = sup{vi ∈ Vi|bi(vi) < bj(vj)}:
Π0(τ r, μr)
= E{vi≥φi(vj)}[vi − hi(vi)] + E{vi<φi(vj)}[vj − hj(vj)]
−Ev2 [π1(v1, v2; τ r, μr)]− Ev1 [π2(v1, v2; τ r, μr)]
= E{vi≥φi(vj)} [vi − hi(vi)− {vj − hj(vj)}] + E[vj − hj(vj)]
−Ev2 [π1(v1, v2; τ r, μr)]− Ev1 [π2(v1, v2; τ r, μr)].
If Fi(·) = Fj(·), then the integrand of the first term in the last line is positive if and only if
vi > vj , so the expected surplus is maximized when φi(v) = v for all v. This can be implemented
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by setting (τ r, μr) = (0, 0) for r = 1, 2, which also ensures that the bidders’ benchmark payoﬀs
are zero. Hence, oﬀering no lockup is optimal for the target in this case.
Suppose now hi(·) ≤ hj(·). Notice that the integrand of the first term in the last line is
positive whenever vi ≤ vj . With (τ r, μr) = (0, 0), φi(v) = v for all v, and and the bidders’
benchmark payoﬀs are all zero since vi = vj . Choosing μj > 0 can only raise φi(v) above v,
which reduces the region in which the positive integrand value is realized, without any other
eﬀect. Thus, μj = 0 is optimal. We already have shown that τ j = 0 is optimal given that
μj = 0. Hence, no lockup to bidder j is optimal. The same logic implies that a lockup to bidder
i is optimal if hi(v) < hj(v) for a positive measure of v. Raising μi slightly from zero expands
the region in which the integrand is strictly positive in this case, and v0 can be so that the
benchmark payoﬀs remain zero.
Proof of Lemma 1. Fix regime j = N,B,L. For brevity, we construct equilibrium
strategies and beliefs for the second case. (The strategies/beliefs for the first case analogous.)
In this case, B1 bids the minimum bid of zero if v1 < vˆj and bˆj if v1 ≥ vˆ. T and B2 then form
a belief as follows. If B1’s initial bid is strictly less than bˆj , then the posterior distribution is
Fi(v) = min{ F (v)F (vˆj) , 1}. If B1’s initial bid is no less than bˆj , then the posterior distribution is
Fi(v) = {max{F (v)−F (vˆ
j)
1−F (vˆj) , 0} . T then accepts B1’s bid if it is no less than bˆj ; otherwise, T rejects
the bid and oﬀers no lockup to B2. B2 then invests c2 if and only if B1’s initial bid is strictly
less than bˆj . Whenever the ascending auction is played, the strategies described in Propositions
1 and 2 are played, given any lockup that may be oﬀered to B2 (oﬀ the equilibrium path).
That this strategy profile/beliefs is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium follows from the definitions
of vˆj , Propositions 1 and 2, and from the fact that v1−Ev2 [π1(v1, v2; 0, 0)] = Ev2 [min{v1, v2}] is










justifying B1’s decision on the initial bid.
Proof of Proposition 4. Observe first that
Π0(0, 0; vˆ)− bˆ(vˆ) = E[min{v1, v2}|v1 ≥ vˆ]− E[min{vˆ, v2}] > 0, (14)
for all vˆ ∈ [v, v), so T will wish to reject bˆj if B2 is willing to enter without a lockup and
vˆ < v. This means that, in regime N, entry will occur if and only if Π2(0, 0; vˆ) − c2 = 0, so
vˆN = sup{vˆ|Π2(0, 0; vˆ)− c2 ≥ 0}. Since
Π2(0, 0; vˆ)− c2 = E[max{v2 − v1, 0}|v1 ≥ vˆ]− c2 < E[max{v2 − vˆ, 0}|v1 ≥ vˆ]− c2 = Γ∗(vˆ),
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for any vˆ < v, and since vˆ∗ < v, it must be that vˆN < vˆ∗.
Next, (14) also implies that, in regimes B and L, T will wish to subsidize B2 to enter whenever
the joint surplus of T and B2 from the entry exceeds the preemptive bid. The reason is that,
in each of the two regimes, T can oﬀer a lockup just suﬃcient for B2 to enter without losing
money. Summarizing, for j = B,L, we must have vˆj ≥ vˆN , and, for vˆ ≥ vˆN ,
Γj(vˆ) =
(
maxτ2 Π0(τ2, 0|vˆ) +Π2(τ2, 0|vˆ)− c2 − bˆ(vˆ) if j = B,
maxτ2μ2 Π0(τ2, μ2|vˆ) +Π2(τ2, μ2|vˆ − c2 − bˆ(vˆ) if j = L.
As shown in the text, for any τ2 ≥ 0,
Π0(τ2, 0|vˆ) +Π2(τ2, 0|vˆ)− c2 − bˆ(vˆ) = Γ∗(vˆ),
so vˆB = vˆ∗ > vˆN .
Finally, Corollaries 2 and 1 imply that, for any μ2 > 0 and vˆ,
Π0(τ2, μ2|vˆ) +Π2(τ2, μ2|vˆ) = E[π0(v1, v2; τ2, μ2) + π2(v1, v2; τ2, μ2)|v1 ≥ vˆ]
> E[π0(v1, v2; 0, 0) + π2(v1, v2; 0, 0)|v1 ≥ vˆ]
= E[π0(v1, v2; τ2, 0) + π2(v1, v2; τ2, 0)|v1 ≥ vˆ]
= Π0(τ2, 0|vˆ) +Π2(τ2, 0|vˆ),
which implies that vˆL > vˆB.
Proof of Corollary 3. The first statement clearly follows from Proposition 4 and Lemma
1. To compare the target’s equilibrium payoﬀs across legal regimes, consider an arbitrary equi-
librium in which B1 preempts successfully with a bid of bˆ(vˆ) = E[min{vˆ, v2}] if v1 ≥ vˆ, and an
eﬃcient auction with each bidding his own valuation arises if v1 < vˆ. The target’s expected
payoﬀ from such an equilibrium would be
U0(vˆ) := E{v1≥vˆ}[min{vˆ, v2}] + E{v1<vˆ}[min{v1, v2}] = E[min{vˆ, v1, v2}],
which is strictly increasing in vˆ ∈ (v, v). Meanwhile, B1’s expected payoﬀ from such an equilib-
rium is
U1(vˆ) := E{v1≥vˆ}[v1 −min{vˆ, v2}] + E{v1<vˆ}[max{v1 − v2, 0}] = E[max{v1 − vˆ, v1 − v2, 0}],
which is strictly decreasing in vˆ ∈ (v, v). Now observe that U ji = Ui(vˆj), j = N,B,L, i = 0, 1.












Proof of Lemma 2. Given the arguments preceding the proposition, it remains to show
that W˜L(τ1, μ1) < WN and U˜L0 (τ1, μ1) < U
N
0 , for any μ1 > 0. The first inequality holds since
the allocation is ineﬃcient conditional on B2’s entry, which implies that W˜L(τ1, μ1) < (v˜L) and
since v˜L < vˆN , which implies that (v˜L) < (vˆN) =WN .
To prove the second inequality, following the revenue equivalence in the proof of Proposition
3, we can write:
U˜L0 (τ1, μ1) = E{v1<min{φ1(v2),v˜L}} [v2 − h2(v2)− {v1 − h1(v1)}] + E[v1 − h1(v1)]
−Ev2 [π1(v, v2; τ1, μ1)]− Ev1 [π2(v1, v; τ1, μ1)]
≤ E{v1<min{v2,v˜L}} [v2 − h2(v2)− {v1 − h1(v1)}] + E[v1 − h1(v1)]
−Ev2 [π1(v, v2; τ1, μ1)]− Ev1 [π2(v1, v; τ1, μ1)]
< E{v1<min{v2,v˜N}} [v2 − h2(v2)− {v1 − h1(v1)}] + E[v1 − h1(v1)]
−Ev2 [π1(v, v2; τ1, μ1)]− Ev1 [π2(v1, v; τ1, μ1)]
≤ E{v1<min{v2,v˜N}} [v2 − h2(v2)− {v1 − h1(v1)}] + E[v1 − h1(v1)]
= UN0 .
The first inequality holds since φ1(v2) ≤ v2 (due to μ1 > 0) and v2 − h2(v2) > v1 − h1(v1)
whenever v1 < v2. The second inequality holds since vˆN > v˜L and v2 − h2(v2) > v1 − h1(v1)
whenever v1 < v2. The third inequality follows since the benchmark type of each buyer receives
zero payoﬀ in regime N. Consequently, U˜L0 (τ1, μ1) < U
N
0 if μ1 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. As observed in the text, Lemma 2 implies that the target will
never oﬀer any lockup if c1 ≤ λU j1 in regime j = N,B,L, and the social welfare realized in
this case is described in Corollary 3. We thus consider the case in which c1 > λU
j
1 . In regime
N, there is no takeover, so the social welfare realized is zero (i.e., the target value under the
existing management). In regime B, T will induce B1 to entry with the minimal necessary
breakup fee if and only if the joint surplus of T and B1 justifies the cost c1. The joint surplus
is λE[v1] since, conditional on q = 1, either B1 acquires T in which case the coalition of T and
B1 realize v1, or else B2 acquires T, in which case T receives B2’s bid v1− τ1 and B1 receives a
breakup fee τ1 from B2. The welfare level realized is given by Lemma 2 whenever B1 is induced
to enter. In regime L, again T induces B1 to enter with the minimal necessary lockup if and
only if the joint surplus of T and B1 justifies the cost c1. Hence, B1 is induced to enter if
and only if ∆L := maxτ1,μ1 λ[U˜0(τ1, μ1) + U˜1(τ1, μ1)] > c1. The welfare level realized depends
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on whether λUL1 < c1 ≤ λUN1 or λUN1 < c1 ≤ ∆L. In the former case, T can induce B1 to
invest by simply committing not to oﬀer any lockup to B2 later on, which it can accomplish by
oﬀering an arbitrarily small amount of lockup (of either kind) to B1. Hence, the welfare realized
would be WN . In the latter case, a nontrivial subsidy is needed for B1 to participate. Corollary
2 implies that the lockup provision will contain a stock lockup. According to Lemma 2, the
realized welfare level will be strictly less than WN in this case.
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B2 decides whether and
how much to bid for T
B1 decides whether and




a lockup to B1
T accepts or
rejects B1’s bid
If T rejects, it may
oﬀer a lockup to B2
Figure 1: Sequence of events
